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   Theoretical reasoning aims at true beliefs; however, it rarely can grasp it. So, it 
would be plausible to define rationality in beliefs by the property of being consistent 
and truth-conducive. The gap between our justifications and the truth has raised a 
seemingly irresolvable problem in analytic epistemology called Gettier’ problem.  
Similarly, it seems that practical reasoning aims at right actions, but it doesn't follow 
that the action which is based on our practical reasoning would always be the right 
and the best one. The gap between our practical reasoning and the right actions has 
caused a huge debate between internalists and externalists about the criterion for 
rationality in normative reasoning (as opposed to motivating reasoning).  
   Recently some epistemologies and moral philosophers tried to explain away these 
two epistemological and practical problems on the basis of contextual approach. 
Epistemic contextualist tries to answer the Gettier problem based on their contextual 
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theory which accommodates all the Gettier’ counterexamples. Likewise, moral 
contextualists have tried to make a middle path between internalist and externalist 
to solve the historical debate between Humean and Kantian on the nature of 
rationality in action. (Bernard Williams and MacDowell are two important 
contemporary representatives of internalism and externalism) (Afroogh 2019; 2020) 
   I believe that both these new approaches which help us to solve our epistemic and 
moral problems are pragmatic ones. Unfortunately, some analytic philosophers 
ignore the history of philosophy as well as other schools of thoughts like continental 
and American philosophy. I hope to show that how William James’ pragmatism is 
the core idea in both theoretical and practical contextualism in analytic philosophy.  
In this paper, first, I will explain briefly the Gettier problem, and then, I will show 
how epistemic contextualism provide us with the best answers to this problem. In 
the second part, I shall briefly explain the debate between internalism and 
externalism as well as some moral considerations and counterexamples in this 
debate, and I will show how contextualism will help us in accommodate all the 
counterexamples and provide us with the best explanation in this regard.  
Finally, In the third part, I shall explain William Jams pragmatism and his theory of 
truth; then I hope to show that how his pragmatism is the central idea of 
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contextualism both in analytic epistemology and the problem of rationality in 
analytic moral philosophy. 1 
 
1- Gettier problem in contemporary epistemology 
 
  For a long time, it was generally accepted that "knowledge" can be defined as the 
justified true belief. It means that we, as language users, can legitimately say “I know 
that P” if and only if: 
- P is true, 
- I believe that P 
- And, I am justified in my belief. 
In “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963), Edmond Gettier has proposed two 
counterexamples for this definition. One of his counterexamples is as follows. 
 
“Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose 
that Smith has strong evidence for the fol1owing conjunctive proposition: (d) 
Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. 
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured 
him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted 
the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The 
man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith 
sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for 
 
1. For further readings on Pragmatism see, (Barzun 1983; Benoist 2005; Bernstein 2010; 
Carrette 2013; Edie 1987; Gale 1999) 
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which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in 
believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he 
himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself 
has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), 
from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the 
following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) 
Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith 
does not KNOW that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins 
in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's 
pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, 
whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.”  
 
In this example, Gettier shows that there can be a case such that all of the three 
abovementioned conditions are obtained, however, it is not intuitively a case of our 
“knowledge." Using reductio ad absurdum, he proves that these necessary 
conditions are not sufficient for the definition of "knowledge." 
  
  Following epistemologists have struggled to modify the definition of knowledge 
such that it excludes the Gettier’s counterexample. Some of the other contributors 
tried to explain away such counterexamples, and still some other have tried to 
reproduce several kinds of Gettier case to show the inescapability of “Gettier cases."  
“Gettier cases” refer to some cases that there is JTB (the three conditions of justified 
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true belief); however, we intuitively don't count them as some part of our 
"knowledge." 
 
1.1 Epistemic contextualism 
 
  Recently, some epistemologies (like  Dretske, 1981) have argued that all the Gettier 
cases can be accommodated if we reform our definition of knowledge based on some 
contextual insights. They state that the condition of “truth” in the definition of 
knowledge, i.e., "True justified belief," is vague. They state that our usages of the 
word "knowledge" completely depend on the contexts we are using them. Our 
epistemic sensitivity is different in low-stakes and high-stakes situations, and it 
makes some important differences. Consider these two examples: 
 
1- I feel pain in my head, but it is not a big deal. I had already the same problem, 
and I went to the hospital C, and I was treated very soon. I “know” that there 
are good physicians there.  
2- I have got cancer, and I should go to visit some good physicians. I don’t 
“know” whether or not there are some good physicians in Hospital C. 
 
  As it is clear, the first example is a low-stakes situation, and that case is not so 
sensitive. So, I can legitimately say that “I know that there are some good physicians 
there." However, the second example refers to a high-stakes situation, and it is really 
a high-stakes case. Therefore, I would be more sensitive about the truth conditions 
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of the “knowledge” in that case, and I say “I don’t know whether or not there are 
some good physicians in hospital C."  
  Contextualist believe that the contexts and the pragmatic sensitivity are so 






2-Internalism vs. externalism: on the nature of rationality 
 
In Internal and External Reason (IER), Bernard Williams proposes his 
influential theory, reason internalism. He argues, metaethically, for what 
considerations can be legitimately called reasons for action. After proposing two 
major interpretations of internalism and externalism, Williams, following Hume 
(based on the standard interpretation), radically claims that all considerations, which 
are capable of being called a reason for someone to do something, are internal 
reasons, and the only true reason-statements are those involved with an internal 
interpretation. According to Bernard Williams, “A has a reason to φ iff A has some 
desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his φ-ing” (Williams, 1979), and 
he modified his theory of reason in two ways. First, sometimes an agent has a reason, 
but just for the sake of being ignorant about that, she is not actually motivated toward 
action for that reason. Secondly, in the case of false belief, an agent come to be 
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motivated towards an action, while she lacks any reason for that act. Williams takes 
internal reason as the criterion for rationality, moral responsibility, moral judgment, 
blameworthiness, and prudentially (Williams, 1989). He also recognized reason 
externalism - which says “there is no such condition, and the reason–sentence will 
not be falsified by the absence of an appropriate motive” (Williams, 1979) - as a 
self-contradictory theory. (Afroogh 2019) 
Williams’ theory (in its standard reading) is distinguished from his Humean 
ancestor by an extended notion of desire (i.e., subjective motivational set) and a new 
conception of instrumental rationality. He defines the subjective motivational set as 
including more mental states than actual desires, like inclinations, beliefs, 
dispositions, etc. So, in some sense, it is not necessarily incompatible with some 
moral agent who would follow Kantian categorical imperative, iff the agent is 
motivated by them; however, even in this case, we have just extensional equality 
between internal and external reason, and it doesn’t follow that the agent has an 
external reason. Furthermore, his conception of instrumental rationality involves 
both objective and subjective reason, which is clear in the examples of gin and tonic 
and ignorant agent.  
Reason externalism, in contrast, is not committed to the abovementioned 
condition for having a reason and it defines reasons for an action independently of 
an agent's motivational set. Reason externalism is not radical in the sense that the 
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only reasons for actions are to be external, or that all of the true reason-statements 
are those with external interpretations. It also doesn't include all the extensions of 
practical reason (like in the case that you want to eat chocolate ice cream, so you do 
it). It is roughly limited just to some universal moral or rational rules like the Kantian 
categorical imperative. However, reason externalism is also, in some other sense, 
extreme. It states that all the agents, in its limited scope, have reason to do something, 
no matter whether they are motivated by these reasons or not, and no matter whether 
they are aware of this reason or not. According to externalism, in this limited scope, 
all people, regardless of the contexts in which they are, are equally responsible for 
their actions. They take the external reason as a criterion for rationality, moral 
responsibility, moral judgment, fare blames and prudential reasoning. (Afroogh 
2021) 
  
2.1- The central problem 
 
The central problem in the debate of external and internal reason consists of 
some moral considerations which traced back to the major conflicts between the 
Humean theory of reason and Kantian categorical imperatives or other universal 
rational rules. 
The rationale of most externalists is moral considerations. They believe, by 
reductio ad absurdum, that if they could not resist internalist's radical view (that 
there are no such things as an external reason), it entails some disastrous conclusion 
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for moral realism and moral absolutism. However, since practical reason is not 
limited to moral action and also due to the controversy of moral objectivity, the same 
consideration is also extended to some prudential reasons.  Externalists believe that 
Hitler had several (moral) reasons to not murder thousands of innocent people no 
matter what motivation and desires he had. In contrast, according to the internalists, 
he had such reasons iff he was motivated to by those reasons. Another example, 
which is proposed by Bernard Williams, is that, according to the reason internalism, 
a man who is not motivated by some considerations to treat his wife well has no 
reason to do this. However, according to reason externalism, he has some reason to 
do this, no matter whether he is motivated by those considerations or not. 
The rationale of reason internalism is also some moral considerations, and 
there are some other moral counterintuitive examples against externalism, too. One 
of the most important moral motivations of Williams' internalism is to defend the 
dignity of human beings and prevent externalists to simply ascribe all the agents 
equally to being irrational and being immoral, regardless of their mental states and 
desires. Protecting people from such a negative attitude (i.e., simply accusing people 
irrespective of their motivations) would be itself one of the major moral 
responsibilities for which we all are responsible. Consider a person in a primitive 
tribe who doesn't know anything about liberal democracy, and she has no such 
conception in her mind at all. She naturally resists all arguments for it as the best 
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political structure to govern every society. Given that liberal democracy is the best, 
according to externalists, she is an irrational and immoral person. However, 
according to Williams’ reason internalism, we are not legitimate to accuse her of 
being irrational if she is not motivated by the arguments. Williams believes that 
external considerations are not a good criterion for our judgment irrespective of their 
mental states. We should analyze her being rational and moral in terms of the reasons 
which are acceptable for her in that contexts, at that moment. 
 
2.2- Contextualist rationality 
 
Theoretical rationality aims at true beliefs; however, it rarely can grasp it. So, 
it would be plausible to define rationality in beliefs by the property of being 
consistent and truth-conducive. Similarly, it seems that practical rationality aims at 
right actions, but it doesn't follow that the action would always be the right and the 
best one. It is completely relative to the contexts, and the pragmatic aspects are so 
important in this regard, and it is independent of the agent’s actual desires and goals 
as well. 
   Contextual rationality believes that Hitler was not a rational agent. The notion of 
rationality is intuitively dependent upon morality in practice. Consider the following 
story. 
    Changzhou and Brayan recently became friends on Facebook. Changzhou is 
living with his tribe in a forest near the equator, and Bernie recently got an iPhone 
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for her. Bernie is a cultural activist who works with some charities in different 
countries. The presidential election of the USA is going to be held in two weeks, and 
Brayan, like some other people, is fully engaged in election campaigns. He talks 
with Changzhou about the election and the voting process in the USA, and he 
explains it to her, and he states that it is a usual political structure for choosing a 
president. Changzhou listens carefully to Brayan to get the idea of democracy; 
however, she is not sympathetic with Brayan, and she thinks that it cannot be the 
best way to choose a leader. She believes that his vote cannot be equal to his 
brother's, father or the vote of the head of the tribe. Brayan implicitly accuses her of 
being irrational, while he himself is going to vote for a racist and sexist person in the 
upcoming election! 
If you think, like Brayan, that Changzhou is an irrational person, you are an 
externalist. If you think that Brayan himself, while he votes for racism and sexism, 
is a rational person, you are an internalist. If not, you probably are sympathetic with 
Bernie who believes in contextual rationality. 
Bernie has been working in different cultures for a long time, and she is 
thoroughly familiar with cultural diversity and its origins and implications in the 
modern world. He knows that why in a war-ridden country carrying a weapon is 
forbidden, while in a country with completely peaceful history it is considered as an 
obvious right. From Bernie’s point of view, it is immoral to accuse Changzhou of 
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being irrational, while it is fully reasonable to condemn Brayan for his immoral and 
irrational approach. Bernie believes that Brayan chooses to be a racist while he is 
living in a context in which it is not so difficult to learn about the reasons for human 
rights and against racism; Brayan knows them; however, he ignores them. Bernie 
believes that it would be morally wrong to recognize Brayan as a rational and moral 
person, even though he is instrumentally rational. 
As it is shown, the central problem in the debate is some moral considerations 
for both reason internalism and externalism. Bernard Williams' theory of rationality 
and moral judgments is correlated with his internal reason, and according to his 
reason internalism, Brayan has no reason to change his mind about racism as long 
as he doesn't come to motivate by some of the reasons against it. Similarly, Hitler 
had no reason to stop killing people as long as he had not been motivated by some 
universal moral codes. Likewise, a person who treats her husband very badly has not 
any reason to change her treatments as long as she is not motivated by some reasons 
for the human rights. Externalists, in contra, believe that moral judgment and 
rationality should be established based on external reason, no matter whether or not 
the agent is motivated or even aware of these rules. So, they, like Brayan, easily 
accuse Changzhou of being immoral and irrational, ignoring the context in which 
she is.  
The best way to define absolute rationality, such that it includes all the 
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intuitive extensions of rationality and moral judgment (like some people who are not 
properly brought up) and excludes all the irrational and immoral ones (like Hitler), 
is the contextual definition of rationality based on contextual reason. “A has a reason 
to φ," is true if the agent is aware of a reason and understands it or it is contextually 
accessible for the agent to be aware of a reason and make a sense out of it, no matter 
if she/he is motivated by that reason or not. Therefore, according to the contextual 
interpretation, Brayan has some strong reasons to stop supporting the racist 
candidate. Hitler has a lot of reasons to stop killing innocent people, and he is 
definitely an immoral and irrational agent. The agent who treats her husband 
immorally is definitely an immoral person if she has been brought up in a context in 
which the action is generally considered as morally bad one. Moreover, it is immoral 
to accuse Changzhou, who is not sympathetic with liberal democracy, of being 
irrational. The argument for liberal democracy is not simply understandable for her 
as much as Brayan. Needless to say, we are talking about judging the agent’s action, 
not the action independently itself.  
Certainly, our judgments about actions are entirely independent of the agent’s 
mental states or the context. We can have an immoral person who is doing a moral 
action (in the case that Hitler is mistakenly condemning his Nazi fellow), or we can 
have a moral person who is doing an immoral action (in a case that a fair judge is 
condemning, based on some false evidence, an innocent people). 
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The contextual approach is based on a middle level of objectivity which is 
contextually accessible to the agent and is a way to avoid the central problems in 
both camps. It provides us with the best intuitive ground to give an intuitive 
explication of both relative and absolute notion of rationality, as well as fair, moral 
judgment and prudential reasoning. 
3- William James’ Pragmatism 
    William James is one of the great contemporary thinkers, and he has done some 
great interdisciplinary works between philosophy and psychology. His The 
Principles of Psychology (1980), is one of the most influential works in both fields, 
and it is full of novel and original ideas like his pragmatism both in theory and 
practice. 
   William James main goal in pragmatism is to reconcile between radical scientism 
and morality as well as the spiritual aspects of human being's life. He is going to 
solve this dilemma, and due to that, he talked about some mental states of human 
beings. He discussed the implications of his pragmatism in the theory of knowledge 
as well.  
   Pragmatism is a “mediating philosophy” which tries to show the significance of 
both external facts and internal aspects of human knowledge. It also takes the 
pragmatic significance of the consequent in its account of the truth. He claims that 
the pragmatism is not just limited to our practical life. It goes beyond that, and it 
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proposes that the best theory about truth is that based on the pragmatic significance 
of the propositions. He states that “truth” is what is good for us to believe. He says: 
 
“The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, 
and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. (1907: 42) 
‘The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, 
just as ‘the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in 
almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course. 
(1907: 106)” (Hookway, 2016) 
 
He also says that: 
“Ideas … become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory 
relations with other parts of our experience. (1907: 34) 
Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously 
from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things 
satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in 
so far forth, true instrumentally. (1907: 34)” (Hookway, 2016) 
 
   This suggests that a belief can be made true by the fact that holding it contributes 
to our happiness and fulfillment. (Hookway, 2016) 
It clearly shows that, according to William James, true beliefs are those which has 
useful usages for our concrete lives. Form this point of view, the true propositions 
are not just limited to the scientific propositions. It included a lot of spiritual 
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propositions as well. That being said, the question is that how James’ pragmatism is 
the core idea of contextualism both in epistemology and practical rationality? 
3.1- The pragmatic sense of epistemic contextalis 
    As I explained, contextualist in epistemology proposes that we can solve the 
Gettier problems by concentrating on the contexts as well as some pragmatic 
insights. They believe that “truth” is not a mind-independent condition for human 
beings' knowledge. The concepts of “truth” is relative to the contexts and its 
semantic varies in low-stakes and high-stakes situations. Most of the contextualists 
are analytic philosophers, however, it seems that such ideas have originated from 
William James pragmatism and his pragmatic theory on the nature of "truth." 
William states that true propositions are those which are good for our concert life 
and they are completely relevant to the context. So. It seems to me that William 
James original idea provides us with the best ground in analytic epistemology to 
answer Gettier problem. What is true in terms of contextualism epistemology is what 
is pragmatically useful in our concrete lives. The interesting point is that Williams 
James has proposed such novel idea about one century ago, and analytic 
philosophers just recently found it helpful for their goals. 
 
3.2- pragmatic sense of contextual rationality 
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The central problem in the debate of external and internal reason consists of some 
moral considerations which traced back to the major conflicts between the Humean 
theory of reason and Kantian categorical imperatives or other universal rational 
rules. 
    Internalist focus just on the internal reason and rationality and they ignore some 
external facts which we need to take into our definition of rationality. In contrary, 
externalist proposes a very ideal and external theory about rationality irrespective of 
some fact on human beings’ psychology. Contextual rationality is a mediating 
philosophy which takes both external facts and human beings psychology into 
account.  
    However, it seems that this mediating approach in analytic philosophy is not 
novel. Williams James' pragmatism provides us with the best ground to propose such 
moderate approach in the definition of rationality. According to William, rational 
(or write), actiosn are those which are good for our lives and have good 
consequences for us. It seems that contextual rationality is just a disguised version 
of William James pragmatism, and again the interesting point is that Williams James 
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